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constitution which, in June, 1868, was approved by Congress.55 Article I
of that constitution described Florida's boundary as running from a point
in the Gulf of Mexibo three leagues from the mainland and "thence
northwestardly three leagues from the land to the next point."56 The
Court concluded that Congress, in accepting the constitution, had per-
formed the very act contemplated by the Submerged Lands Act and,
therefore, Florida's seaward boundary extended three marine leagues into
the sea from low-water mark.
Thus was it that the boundaries of the coastal states were not deter-
mined until June 15, 1960, more than one-hundred eighty years after the
founding of this country.
5-- 15 Stat. 73 (1868).
6 FL.A. CONST. art. 1.
THE ENIGMA OF FOURTH AMEND-
MENT PROTECTIONS
Fourth amendment1 protections against illegal search and seizure would
seem to be among the most ill-defined and misconstrued of the guarantees
of the Constitution interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Up
until Elkins v. United States2 the "silver platter" doctrine proved to be a
means by which the Court allowed the fourth amendment to be a paper
protection only. By using as a basis for its decisions federal rules of evi-
dence3 or the particular facts of the case before it,4 the Court created
confusion and contradictory decisions which existed until the Elkins rul-
1 The fourth amendment reads as follows: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmative and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
3 E.g., Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451 (1948); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927); Silverthome Lumber v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), wherein
the Court stated: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in
a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it should not be used at all." Id. at 392.
4 E.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199
(1952); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 (1947); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Go-Bart Importing v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), wherein the Court stated: "Each case is to be de-
cided on its own facts and circumstances." Id. at 357. Cf. Rochin v. California. 342
J.S. 165 (1952); Anello v, United States, 269 U.S, 20 (1920),
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ing.5 In Elkins, the Court also failed to attack the proper issue, i.e.,
fourth amendment constitutional protections, and merely arrived at its
decision by applying the "rules of evidence" doctrine and the concept of
"ordered liberty"-a theory used in the determination of fourteenth
amendment cases by which decisions are based on the facts of each par-
ticular case. Yet, as will be demonstrated, the effect of Elkins is the same
as if the Court had squarely decided the real question before it.
The essence of the "silver platter" doctrine was first enunciated in
Weeks v. United States.6 The Court ruled that all illegally obtained evi-
dence was inadmissible in a federal court when seized by federal officers.
The Court further stated, however, that if evidence was illegally seized
by state officers, it could not be held inadmissible since the fourth amend-
ment is binding on the federal government only. Thus a situation existed
whereby illegally obtained evidence could be introduced into a federal
court-state officials were able to transfer all evidence to federal authori-
ties whether it was legally obtained or not, since by the Weeks decision
the fourth amendment could not be applied to state acts. The Court in a
later decision provided the Weeks' doctrine with its shorthand appella-
tion when it stated:
The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if
he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by
state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter.7
Such was the rule of law when the Elkins case was decided.
THE VITAL CONCEPT
At this time, it would be well to explain exactly the purpose for which
this comment is written, and then to discuss some cases in connection
with the author's theory. Up until and including Elkins, the Court has
"begged the issue" as regards the "silver platter" doctrine. Instead of rul-
ing as to one's constitutional privileges, the Court has decided the cases
either on the basis that the facts did or did not violate the concept of or-
dered liberty under the fourteenth amendment, so as to deny one his due
process of law, or they have looked upon the articles seized as evidence,
and have ruled on their admissibility through the established rules of evi-
dence. The Court would look at the federal rule of evidence or court-
created procedure which they felt was applicable and would simply as-
certain if such was binding on the individual states, thus ignoring the
5 E.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Compare Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74 (1949).
G 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
.ustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (Emphasis added.)
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constitutional question involved.8 In this manner, the Court "handled"
the constitutional question without the need for interpretation of the
fourth amendment. This could only lead to confusion and controversy,
for it is submitted that failure to recognize the actual issue at its first im-
pression level will tend to lead a court further and further astray with
each subsequent case. The important and only issue involved in the "sil-
ver platter" cases is: "Does the fourth amendment extend to the state as
well as to the federal government?" The Supreme Court has ruled that it
was an "unquestioned premise that the Bill of Rights, when adopted, was
for the protection of the individual against the federal government and
its provisions were inapplicable to similar actions done by the states.""
The fourteenth amendment, however, provided a possibility that the prin-
ciple enunciated in the fourth amendment could be considered as falling
within the ambit of one's due process of law.10 At first the Court refused
to consider this concept. It adopted instead the doctrine of "fundamental
fairness" and "ordered liberty" as expressed in Powell v. Alabama." This
legal theory maintains that due process is an ever-moving, flexible pro-
tection, and that it is for the Court to decide what due process consists of
in relationship to the facts given:
[T]he constitutional meaning as value of the phrase "due process of law,"
remains to-day without that satisfactory precision of definition which judicial
decisions have given to nearly all the other guarantees of personal rights .... 12
Thus this theory would hold that each case should be decided separately
and by "the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion .... "13
Powell allowed the Court to adopt this concept where personal freedoms
were being threatened by state authority.
If the facts violate the Court's concept of "fundamental fairness" or
"ordered liberty" it is to be ruled a denial of due process. 14 Therefore,
the fact that a state government violates a Bill of Rights amendment is of
no consequence, since the Court looks only to the facts in question and
8 Cases cited note 3 supra.
9 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51 (1947). Cf. Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487 (1944); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
1o Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
11287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101-102 (1877). See Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932).
13 Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 12, at 104.
14 E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948);
Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
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the fourteenth amendment.' 5 This concept, however, was modified even
before Powell, and therefore without its aid, when the Court held the
first amendment to be incorporated into the fourteenth. 16 As was noted
above, however, another alternative to the solution of the problem of ad-
missibility of illegally seized evidence was open to the Court. Since the
"silver platter" doctrine is primarily concerned with evidence admissibil-
ity, cases in which it was involved could be resolved by interpretation of
federal evidentiarv rules and its effect on state courts.'7 No determina-
tion of one's constitutional rights under the fourth had to be considered,
but only federal rules of evidence as they concerned state trial procedure.
In 1949, the Court in Wolf v. Colorado"8 incorporated the fourth
amendment into the fourteenth, but in this instance did so by means of
the aforementioned Powell concept.
The securit, of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core'of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It' is there-
fore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause.'9
It would appear that finally the Court was going to determine the funda-
mental issue involved, but instead it issued a disappointing decision. Even
though the states were subject to the fourth amendment, they were not
subject to the exclusionary rule which excluded the admission of illegally
seized evidence. The rationale behind this ruling was that such a rule was
for federal courts to follow, and the states could adopt whatever rules
they wished as long as such rules did not violate the Court's concept of
"ordered liberty."
[.. T]his Court has decided that the Fourteenth Amendment does not, through
its due process clause or otherwise, have the effect of requiring the several
states to conform the procedures of their state criminal trials to the precise
procedure of the federal courts, even to the extent that the procedure of the
federal courts is prescribed by the Federal Constitution or Bill of Rights. 20
1., Ibid.
16 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See also CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382
(1950); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Thornhill A. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931); AVhitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
17 Cases cited note 4 supra.
Is 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
19 Id. at 27-28 (Emphasis added.)
20 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 656 (1948). See Mr. Justice Black's concurring
opinion in Volf, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), wherein he stated that "the federal exclusionary
rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judiciably created rule of
evidence which Congress might negate" and therefore, the basis for Wolf should be
on the protections included in the amendment. Id. at 39-40.
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Thus, such reasoning would seem to allow the fourth amendment to be
violated at will by a state so long as there is no disturbance of the Court's
idea of "ordered liberty." Thus, even though it was in violation of the
fourth amendment, illegal evidence could be introduced, since it appeared
that the Court gave precedence to evidentiary rules rather than to the
Constitution itself-the federalism created by the Constitution was to be
more important than the Constitution itself.
It is this writer's contention that the Elkins Court erred in not holding
that the fourth amendment is applicable to the states-regardless of Wolf
or Weeks-and that any evidence so seized could not be admitted to trial;
and the latter contention is part of the broader belief that all of the Bill
of Rights amendments should be applicable to the states. The Court, and
history also, remind one of the basis for which these amendments were
ratified.2' These amendments were created to protect the states from the
fear of a strong central government similar to that which existed when
they were English colonies. The prevailing atmosphere was to keep the
states as strong, and the central government as weak, as possible. The Civil
lVar reversed this concept however. The war between the states, besides
settling other important matters, assured the dominance of the central
government over the states. 22 The fourteenth amendment was ratified to
place on the states the same burdens as were already incumbent on the
central government. It would seem ludicrous to suppose that the stronger
of the two governments was to have more curbs and restrictions than its
weaker subsidiary. The intention of the fourteenth, therefore, through
the due process clause was to subject the states to at least the same restric-
tions.23 The Court and others have ,failed to see this. 24 In two instances
the Court has made exceptions to the non-incorporation of the first ten
amendments into the fourteenth-i.e., in the case of the first and fourth
amendments; but it did so in the latter amendment for the reason that
"ordered liberty" 25 would be upset and not on the basis that such is a fun-
damental right guaranteed to all, as it did in the incorporation of the first
amendment.2 6 In their incorporation of the fourth, the Court also retained
21 Cases cited note 9 supra.
22 McLAUGHLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1935); TEN BROKK,
ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951).
23 This contention is borne out somewhat by the dissent of Mr. Justice Black in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), wherein he partially holds the view ex-
pounded by this writer: Justice Black states that the intent of the authors of the four-
teenth amendment was to include within it the first ten amendments; on the other hand,
he makes no mention of why that intention existed.
24 Cases cited notes 3 & 4 supra.
"
5 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
26 Cases cited note 16 supra.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
the right to consider the concept of evidence admissibility, which was
considered the dominant issue, and not the fourth amendment's constitu-
tional protections.
THE CASES AND THE INCONSISTENCIES
By the Wolf decision the rationale for the "silver platter" concept was
overruled. The entire rationale behind Weeks was that the fourth amend-
ment was restricted to the federal government. Therefore, any evidence,
be it from individuals 27 or state officials, 28 could be admitted into federal
courts whether it was legally or illegally seized. Wolf bound the states to
observe fourth amendment protections, so that "in ruling that the Fourth
Amendment Prohibition operates through the fourteenth to make unrea-
sonable state searches unconstitutional, the Court overruled the very con-
stitutional pronouncement and holding upon which the Weeks decision
. ... had predicated the admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal
trial." 29 Still, at the same session, the Court continued to support the
"silver platter" doctrine.8 0
Later cases continued to be just as confusing. In Benanti v. United
States,31 petitioner was convicted of possession of spirits without federal
stamps. Evidence used to convict Benanti was obtained by state officials
through the use of wire taps and then transferred to federal officers for
trial. Petitioner claimed that such evidence was illegal and inadmissible
under- a Congressional act.3 2 Again the Court was given the opportunity
to overrule the "silver platter" doctrine, but in a unanimous opinion, the
Court failed to so overrule or even examine the issue:
It has remained an open question in this Court whether evidence obtained
solely by state agents in an illegal search may be admissible in federal courts
despite the Fourth Amendment.... The instant decision is not concerned with
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 33
The evidence was allowed, for the Court held that Congress only in-
tended that such a rule of evidence be extended to federal courts, and that
it in no way was restrictive upon the states.
Two cases in direct relationship to federal rules of procedure and their
27 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
28 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
29 Hanna v. United States, 260 F. 2d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Accord, Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
30 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
31 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
32 26 U.S.C.A. § 5008 (Supp. 1959).
33Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 n. 10 (1957).
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application to the states are Stefanelli v. Minard84 and Rea v. United
States. 5 In both cases, injunctions were sought to keep illegally obtained
evidence from being admitted at trial. Stefanelli, however, involved state
evidence which was to be given to federal authorities, whereas Rea in-
volved the transferring of illegally obtained evidence from the federal to
the state level. It is not difficult to surmise, on the basis of the preceding
discussion, that in Rea the injunction was granted, whereas in Stefanelli, it
was not. The Rea Court stated:
The command of the Federal Rules is in no way affected by anything that
happens in a state court. They are designed as standards for federal agents. The
fact that their violation may be condoned by state practice has no relevancy to
our problem. Federal courts sit to enforce federal law; and federal law extends
to the process issuing from those courts. The obligation of the federal agent is
to obey the Rules. They are drawn for innocent and guilty alike. They prescribe
standards for law enforcement. They are designed to protect the privacy of the
citizen, unless the strict standards set for searchs and seizures are satisfied. That
policy is defeated if the federal agent can float them and sue the fruits of his un-
lawful act either in federal or state proceedings.3 6
The Stefanelli Court, on the other hand, did not have control of the state
law enforcers, as it had of the federal agents, and thus could not grant the
injunction:
Here the considerations governing that discretion touch perhaps the most
sensitive source of friction between States and Nations, namely, the active in-
trusion of the federal courts in the administration of the criminal law for the
prosecution of crimes solely within the power of the States.
We hold that the federal courts should refuse to intervene in State criminal
proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when claimed to have been
secured by search and seizure8T
The Wolf doctrine created a situation of inconsistencies. The philos-
ophy extended from Weeks to Wolf was simply a matter of not ruling
the fourth amendment to be incorporated into an individual's right to be
free from state encroachment. The decisions which followed Weeks, but
preceded Wolf had at least some justification for their decision in either
rules of evidence or in particular factual situations. It is submitted that
after Wolf it would seem that the Court could not employ these latter
means to avoid the constitutional question, since the fourth amendment
was held binding on the states through the fourteenth. Instead, however,
the Court's attitude after the Wolf decision appeared to be that of the
cook who, learning that the meat in the soup was tainted, took out the
meat, but left the soup to be drunk.
:4 342 U.S. 117 (1951). -3 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
36 Id. at 217-218. (Emphasis added.)
'3 Stefanelli v. United States, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
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In Hanna v. United States,38 the Court of Appeals of the District of Co-
lumbia overruled the "silver platter" doctrine in its application in the
District. In this case, Maryland officials illegally seized evidence and
turned it over to authorities in the District of Columbia. The Court rea-
soned that since Wolf overruled the very basis of the "silver platter" doc-
trine, it should no longer be followed, and therefore "all evidence ob-
talied by violation of the Constitution should be excluded. ' 3 The Court
also pointed out the illogicality in holding that it is unconstitutional to
admit evidence illegally obtained by federal officers, but constitutional to
admit evidence which has been so obtained by state officers:
It cannot rationally be argued that the constitutional protection is so gravel),
impaired by using such evidence in federal courts when a federal officer has
violated the Fourth Amendment, but there is no significant impairment when
it is a state officer who has been guilty of an equivalent violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Perhaps the sanction of excluding such evidence from
federal trials has a greater deterrent effect upon federal officers than upon state
officers. But there is no calculus to measure such a difference, nor is it the kind
of difference which warrants opposite conclusions as to the admissibility of the
evidence.40
This decision was rendered two years prior to Elkins, and was the foun-
dation for that case.
Elkins v. United States41 was decided by a five to four majority. Peti-
tioner Elkins was convicted of wire tapping, a federal offense. The evi-
dence used to gain this conviction was obtained by Oregon officials
through an unlawful search and consequent seizure- In the state proceed-
ings, the evidence was disallowed, but at the federal level, all motions to
disallow admission of the evidence were quashed. On appeal, the Supreme
Court ruled that such evidence was inadmissible and, as before stated, in
effect overthrew the "silver platter" doctrine. Mr. Justice Stewart, who
delivered the majority opinion, followed the lead of Hanna and reasoned
that the basis upon which the "silver platter" doctrine existed had been
overruled by Wolf. He stated: "The foundation upon which the admis-
sibility of state-seized evidence in a federal trial originally rested-that
unreasonable state searches did not violate the Federal Constitution-thus
disappeared in [ Wolf]. '42 Justice Stewart made the further point that the
Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule was to protect individuals from
3S 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
39 Id. at 728. (Emphasis added.)
401d. at 728-29. (Emphasis added.) See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928), wherein the Court stated: "I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part." Id. at 470.
41364 U.S. 206 (1960).
42 d. at 213.
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unlawful invasion of federal officials: "The rule is calculated to prevent,
not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitu-
tional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it.''43
He then went on to inquire how such incentive could become non-
existent when there was an available means by which federal officials
could skirt the rule-namely, state-seized evidence. And by rejecting the
contention of the Government that the foundation of our federal system
was being imperiled by federal encroachment in activities reserved for the
states, Justice Stewart indirectly emphasized the holding in Hanna:
The very essence of a healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of need-
less conflict between state and federal courts. Yet when a federal court sitting
in an exclusionary state admits evidence lawlessly seized by state agents, itnot
only frustrates state policy, but frustrates that policy in a particularly inappro-
priate and ironic way. For by admitting the unlawfully seized evidence the
federal court serves to defeat the state's effort to assure obedience to the Federal
Constitution. 44
Lastly, Mr. Justice Stewart showed that since Wolf, state courts have
tended to adopt rules similar to the exclusionary rule practiced in federal
courts. 45 He maintained that the trend towards state adoption of this rule
is continuing, and that the protection of federalism could best be served
by overruling the "silver platter" doctrine.
The opinion in Elkins contains two areas which would seem to deserve
criticism. First of all, there was a failure again to rule on the basic issue of
fourth amendment guarantees. The Court effected a ruling that is the
same if they had looked to fourth amendment guarantees only, but yet
based their decision on "formulated rules of evidence to be applied in
federal criminal prosecutions."46 Evidence admissibility was left as the im-
4: Id. at 217. (Emphasis added.)
44 Id. at 22 1.
45 In this instance it is difficult to perceive how the Court arrived at such a conclu-
sion. Prior to Wolf, twenty-one state supreme courts had adopted a facsimile of the
federal court's exclusionary rule including Alaska and Hawaii. Twenty-nine courts
ruled that illegally obtained evidence could be admitted into a state case. After the
Wolf ruling only five state courts adopted the exclusionary rule, but two states, Michi-
gan and South Dakota, compiled with Wolf entirely and instead of upholding the ex-
clusionary rule, which they had done in the past, the courts adopted a partially exclud-
able rule in conformance to the Wolf doctrine. Thus, although twenty-six state courts
have now some applicable form of the exclusionary rule in their procedure, it hardly
seems that such can be used as a basis for demonstrating a strong trend of state adop-
tion of the exclusionary rule. In the past eleven years only five states have adopted it
and two have greatly modified their procedure to conform to Wolf. For discussion in
accord with this writer's view see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
46 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960). Cf. McNabb v. United States
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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portant criterion in regard to search and seizure violations, and not the
fourth amendment itself. An obvious inconsistency also exists in the El-
kins opinion. The Court stated: "The question with which we deal today
affects not at all the freedom of the states to develop and apply their own
sanctions in their own way. '47 This statement, when taken in conjunction
with the ruling that federal evidentiary rules were to apply, would seem
to dictate that discretion still remains in the hands of the states as to ad-
missibility of unlawfully seized evidence in an exclusive state matter as
long as there is no infringement of "fundamental fairness" or "ordered
liberty." But suppose that a state proceeding is brought to the federal
courts on appeal under the assertion of a denial of due process. This is
where the inconsistency lies, for the Court also stated:
In determining whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure
by state officers, a federal court must make an independent inquiry, whether
or not there has been such an inquiry by a state court, and irrespective of how
any such inquiry may have turned out. The test is one of federal law, neither
enlarged by what one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by
what another may have colorably suppressed.48
The result of maintaining such a position when a decision of a state is
appealed to a federal court, is that the seized evidence must be excluded
if in violation of the fourth amendment. In effect, the Court is forcing the
states to observe the fourth amendment protections just as they did with
the first amendment guarantees. But on the other hand, the Court, while
recognizing the incorporation of the fourth amendment into the four-
teenth, still refuses to give it the status of a fundamental guarantee which
it accords to the first amendment. One would seem forced to conclude
that to the Court the fourth amendment is not such a fundamental guar-
antee as is the first.
CONCLUSION
It is believed that the Court will continue to arrive at such incongruous
and conflicting decisions49 until they expressly adhere to the trend which
47 Elkins v. United States, supra note 46 at 221.
48 Id. at 223-24. (Emphasis added.)
49 In the same session as Elkins, the Court has so adopted such an opinion. In Ohio
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), Mr. Justice Stewart disqualified himself
since his father was a member of the bench which decided the case on the state level.
The Court, therefore, was divided four to four as to the constitutionality of a state
law allowing inspections without issuance of a search warrant. Since the Court was
evenly divided, the lower court decision which upheld the constitutionality of the law
was sustained. As Mr. Justice Stewart stated, such test as to the validity of such
searches was to be on a federal basis regardless of prior state court determination. Such
a search by federal authorities would be deemed as unlawful. Therefore, because of
the self-imposed disqualification of Mr. Justice Stewart, a law which is unconstitutional
remains constitutional.
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the fourth amendment is taking, namely, that it is part of the fourtcenth
amendment and completely binding upon the states regardless of the facts
involved or the evidence rules being employed in the case'n-:md it would
seem that only then will the Court secure the vitality of the fourth
amendment for the individual against oppressive and authoritarian be-
havior.
50 It should be noted that thcre are four basic circumstances in which this issue can
be brought before the Court. First, there is federal evidence admitted into a federal
court; second, there is state evidence admitted into a state court; third, state evidence
admitted into a federal court; and fourth, federal evidence admitted into a state court
proceeding. As noted above, all evidence illegally seized in the first two instances would
be excluded and in the third instance, would have to be excluded if brought on appeal
to the federal level. As yet, no determination as to the admittance of evidence obtained
illegally by federal officials into a state trial has been rendered by the Court. In People
v. Fiorito, 19 I11. 2d 246, 166 N.E. 2d 606 (1960), such a determination can be reached.
A petition for writ of certiorari has been filed. 29 U.S. L. WEEK 3077 (U.S. Sept. 20,
1960) (No. 320). By the Court's own words, such evidence would be excluded if the
writ is granted, for the "test is one of federal law." Since, however, this is an Illinois case
and Illinois has adopted the exclusionary rule, the Court, if they are to grant the writ,
will have to re-examine the facts of the case in order to determine if such evidence was
illegally obtained or not. It is questionable that they will grant the writ, however, since
the Illinois Supreme Court has already applied the exclusionary rule and has determined
that the evidence in question was not illegally seized.
A WIFE'S ACTION FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
DUE TO NEGLIGENCE
Whether a married woman may sue for loss of the consortium of her
husband, due to his injury by the negligent act of a third party, presents a
challenging question to the legal profession. Directly involved is the basic
feature of the Anglo-American legal system, the doctrine of stare decisis.
Also involved is the sociological concept of the law, i.e., the concept that
the law is, and reflects, the prevalent common concepts of civilized soci-
ety. It is the clash of these two doctrines which presents the challenge.
The aforegoing is not meant to give the impression, however, that the
law as to the wife's right to sue is unclear in any particular jurisdiction.
Such is not usually the case. Rather the opposite is true, and the jurisdic-
tions which have decided the point are quite definite as to what they
hold. The challenge is in reality national in scope. The movement of
American courts to a new view demanded by the times we live in, as op-
posed to clinging to well established concepts of the law-this is the chal-
lenge. Which side of the issue a lawyer might take at a particular time
would depend on whether he represented the wife or the defendant, for
neither side lacks arguments. This paper's purpose is to trace the develop-
